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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
CALIFORNIA SCHOOLTEACHERS' PRIVILEGE TO INFLICT
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
The prediction of 100 years ago that corporal punishment in schools
would soon be forgotten' has not come to pass. 2 In California this is evi-
denced by a recent legislative enactment which expressly authorizes the
use of corporal punishment in schools. 3 Also bearing upon the problem is
Penal Code section 273a, which prohibits the unjustified infliction by any
person of physical pain on any child. This section was amended in 1963
by raising the penalty from fine to imprisonment.4 It thus appears that the
teacher who abuses his privilege by inflicting unjustified corporal punish-
ment will be subjected to the base punishment of imprisonment. It is
the purpose of this note to investigate the present uncertain status of the
teacher's privilege in California.
The cases treating a school teacher's liability for corporal punishment
have been concerned with two questions, namely, how much punishment
may a teacher inflict, and secondly, when may a teacher punish. The early
view is stated in State v. Fendergrass5 where the court held that, short of
inflicting permanent injury upon the pupil, the teacher was the sole judge
of when to punish and of how much punishment the pupil deserved. With
respect to the amount of punishment which the teacher may inflict, the
rule of this case is obviously harsh, and the permanent injury rule has been
almost completely superseded by the rule that the teacher is liable for
excessive punishment, with excessiveness generally being a question of fact
for the jury.6 In passing on the question of excessiveness, the cases have
considered primarily the manner in which the punishment is inflicted,7 and
I Annot., 76 Am. Dec. 164 (1886); Cooper v. McJundn, 4 Ind. 290 (1853).
2As evidenced by recent cases, Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49, 43
A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A.2d 639 (1958);
Tinkam v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961); People v. Baldini, 4 Misc.
2d 913, 159 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Mt. Vernon City Ct. 1957).
3 CA.L. Enuc. CoDE § 10854, Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 85 § 2, p. 1088, renumbering CAL.
EDUC. CoDE § 10853, Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2130, p. 5031.
4 Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 783 amended CAL. PEN. CoDE § 273a by deleting "guilty of
a misdemeanor" and adding "punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or in the state prison for not less than one year nor more than 10 years."
5 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & B.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1837).
6 Serres v. South Santa Anita School Bd., 10 Cal. App. 2d 152, 51 P.2d 893 (1935)
(battery statute); Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 Ad. 273 (1886); Commonwealth
v. Randall, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 36 (1855); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec.
156 (1859); see Annots., 89 A.L.R.2d 396 (1963), 43 A.L.R.2d 469 (1955).
7Excessiveness concerns the extent of the injury to the pupil and is not determina-
tive of the existence of the privilege, Christman v. Hicknan, 225 Mo. App. 828, 37
S.W.2d 672 (1931) (teacher is privileged up to the point of excess; the excess consti-
tutes the offence). Excessiveness is usually associated with lacerations, or with hitting
in places conducive to serious injury, e.g., Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853)
(head); Rupp v. Zinter, 29 Pa. D. & C. 625 (C.P. Montgomery County 1937) (ear);
Melen v. McLaughlin, 107 Vt. 111, 176 Ad. 297 (1935) (kidney). It does not appear
that excessiveness would comprehend the ordinary spanking or the single blow on the
behind. See Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N.E. 341 (1888). These situations
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the teacher's knowledge of the pupil's history and of the immediate circum-
stances giving rise to the punishment.8
Concerning the question of when may a teacher punish, the cases have
reflected confusion principally because of the tendency to regard the
teacher's privilege as merely an extension of the parental privilege to inflict
corporal punishment.9 Many cases have justified the teacher's privilege by
saying that the teacher is in loco parentis with respect to the child, in the
place of the parent, and hence has the same privilege which the law gives
to the parent to deal with the child.10 This view confined the teacher's
privilege to situations where it could be found that the parent had expressly
or impliedly delegated the privilege to the teacher. However, the parental
delegation theory has been overruled in cases where it could not be invoked
to justify the teacher's authority, e.g., where the pupil is an adult," or where
parental consent is expressly withheld.12 In these cases the courts realized
that the duty to maintain classroom discipline is inherent to the educational
process,' 3 and that the proper discharge of the teacher's duty to maintain
order among a large group of pupils may require punishment which will
not necessarily coincide with the interest of a parent in correcting his child's
faults. The more logical view, and the one more consistent with the exigen-
cies of mass education, is that the teacher's authority to punish extends to
all situations which directly affect the order and discipline of the school,
and is entirely independent of the parental authority to deal with the child.' 4
Thus the teacher's privilege has been held to extend to punishment for fail-
ing to do homework in the evening while under the jurisdiction of the
are more properly considered as questions relating to the existence of the teacher's
privilege, i.e., whether or not the teacher may inflict any punishment at all.
8 People v. Newton, 185 Misc. 405, 56 N.Y.S.2d 779 (White Plains City Ct. 1945)
(evidence of pupil's prior misconduct of which the defendant teacher knew held ad-
missible as bearing upon the reasonableness of the punishment inflicted for the imme-
diate offence); accord, Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A.2d 639 (1958);
People v. Mummert, 183 Misc. 243, 50 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Nassau County Ct. 1944).
9 See, eg., Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 17 Am. Rep. 471 (1874).
30 State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & B.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1837);
Cleary v. Booth, [18931 1 Q.B. 465. In McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HAiv. L. REV. 1030, 1069 (1930), referring to the assault and battery cases
wherein a minor child sues one in loco parentis, the author states, "The basic assumption
of these cases, however, is that one in loco Varentis is in the same position as a parent."
1 State v. Mizner, 45 Iowa 248 (1876), afd, 50 Iowa 145, 37 Am. Rep. 128
(1878); Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 (1847).
12 Cf. Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562 (1871) (pupil expelled).
i3 See Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194, 389 P.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(upheld dismissal of teacher for failure to maintain discipline); People v. Petrie, 120
Misc. 221, 223, 198 N.Y. Supp. 81, 83 (Herkimer County Ct. 1923), where the court
stated, "A teacher must be in authority . . . in a school. If not, there would be no
school."; 5 CAL. Anm. CODE § 24.
'4 Note, 26 ILL. L. REv. 815 (1932); PEnxms, CumnNA. LAw 879 (1957); PNossam,
TORTS 113 (2d ed. 1955); Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 V.ND. L. REv. 723
(1959); People v. Newton, 185 Misc. 405, 56 N.Y.S.2d 779 (White Plains City Ct.
1945).
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parent, 5 and to offences directly affecting the school committed by a pupil
after returning to his home.' 6
The cases from which the rule concerning when a teacher may punish
has evolved have all rested upon the question whether, on the facts of the
case, the teacher had authority to punish, i.e., whether or not the teacher-
pupil relationship existed.'7 The California case of People v. Curtiss'8 was
the first case to expressly grant the trier of fact the power to determine
whether the teacher had the privilege to punish where the teacher-pupil
relationship concededly existed. In Curtiss the court held that a teacher
is privileged to inflict corporal punishment but he must act reasonably in
determining whether or not the privilege exists; i.e., the trier of fact, not
the teacher, is the judge of whether or not the privilege exists.' 9 On the
facts of the case the court held the teacher had Lo privilege because she
spanked a seven year old pupil without confirming a hearsay report that
the pupil had been in a fight. The appellate court affirmed the teacher's
conviction under Penal Code section 273a, which at that time was a mis-
demeanor. Although concededly acting within her authority,20 the teacher
in Curtiss was held liable because, on the facts of the case, the pupil did
not deserve punishment. This basis of liability suggests the disapproved
parental delegation theory, i.e., the teacher punished when a parent would
not have punished. In view of the teacher's duty to maintain the discipline
of an entire group of pupils, it is submitted that Curtiss sets forth an im-
proper rule for schoolteachers.
Besides the fact that teachers do correct individual pupils, the teacher's
duty to maintain discipline may require punishment as a preventive measure,
with the misconduct of any specific pupil being only the occasion for punish-
ment which is meant principally to affect the order and discipline of the
15 Bolding v. State, 23 Tex. Ct. App. R. 172, 4 S.W. 579 (1887).
6 O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 128 Atl. 25 (1925).
17For example, in the leading case of Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec.
156 (1859), the defendant teacher was at home when he was insulted by one of several
of his pupils who were passing by the defendant's house. The fact that the teacher was at
home suggests prima facie that the teacher-pupil relation did not exist, and the court in-
timated that had the defendant and the pupil been alone, defendant would not have been
privileged to punish the pupil later at school. It was the insult by the individual pupil
plus the presence of the other pupils that created the teacher's jurisdiction to punish, since
the act threatened to derogate defendant's authority as a teacher, thereby threatening
the order and discipline of the school. The issue was whether the pupil's act under
these circumstances deterimentally affected defendant's status as a teacher, thereby
requiring punishment because of the interest in maintaining discipline in the school.
Whether the pupil deserved corrective punishment-which would be the interest of
the pupil's parent-was not at issue.
18 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 300 Pac. 801 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles 1931).
19 See Note, 5 So. CAL. L. Ptv. 173 (1932).
20 The court did not discuss this point, and evidently conceded that the teacher-
pupil relation existed. The punishment by defendant teacher, a spanking, took place
at school in the presence of two other teachers. The pupil's offence, fighting, has been
held by several cases to be a prime example of an offence which justifies corporal punish-
ment. Suits v. Clover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49, 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Dowlen
v. State, 14 Tex. Ct. App. R. 61, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 49 (1883); Hutton v. State, 23 Tex.
Ct. App. R. 386, 5 S.W. 122 (1887); Cleary v. Booth, [1893] 1 Q.B. 465.
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entire group of pupils.21 Under these circumstances punishment which may
be unjustified as to the individual pupil-which is the basis of liability on
the Curtiss theory-may be justified because of its beneficial effect upon the
entire school. Examples of this would be where the teacher exaggerates
the misconduct of a particular pupil with a view to setting an example for
the other pupils, or when the teacher punishes an acknowledged leader
among the pupils, whose misfortune will have a greater influence upon the
order and discipline of the school than would a similar misfortune suffered
by another pupil. As between the parties involved Curtiss appears to have
been decided correctly, but the holding of the case as a first-impression
construction of Penal Code section 273a is defective because it would not
comprehend, for example, the disciplinary situations suggested above.
Curtiss was decided in 1931 and remains the only construction in the
teacher-pupil context of Penal Code section 273a. The 1963 amendment
to this statute raises the penalty to imprisonment, leaving the substance
of the statute intact.22 The crime for which the teacher in Curtiss was pun-
ished (by a fine of 100 dollars) was an unjustified spanking, and, in view
of the substantial rise in penalty, it would seem that, despite being under a
positive duty to maintain discipline, no reasonable teacher would wish to
risk inflicting any punishment 23 Considering the fact that Penal Code
section 273a is a general statute for the protection of children, and consid-
ering the specific legislative authorization of corporal punishment in schools
by Education Code section 10854, it is submitted that Penal Code section
273a should not apply to schoolteachers.
Section 10854 states, "The governing board of any school district shall
adopt rules and regulations authorizing teachers, principals, and other certi-
fied personnel to administer reasonable corporal or other punishment to
pupils when such action is deemed an appropriate corrective measure."
It is submitted that the words "when such action is deemed an appropriate
corrective measure" should be deleted from the statute. The presence of
these words tends to suggest an approach to the teacher's privilege similar
to that taken by Curtiss. It has been seen that the decision in Curtiss unduly
restricts the situations in which a teacher may exercise the privilege in a
manner inconsistent with the disciplinary requirements of a large group
of pupils. The word reasonable sufficiently controls the privilege, and should
21Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (despite rule of
board of education that punishment could be inflicted only by the school principal,
teacher held not liable for slapping pupil because the teacher acted not to punish the
pupil but to restore order and discipline); cf. O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal. App. 2d 449,
109 P.2d 8 (1941); People v. McMillan, 45 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 821, 114 P.2d 440
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles 1941).
22See note 4 supra.
23See Dugan, Teachers' Tort Liability, 11 CLxv.-MmA. L. REv. 512, 520 (1962),
where the author states, "But a teacher should not be so hamstrung by the law of
intentional torts, especially with respect to alleged assaults and batteries, that it inter-
feres with his function-to teach. One whose most recent experience with education
has been at the university level tends to forget that serious discipline problems exist
at the lower levels. A teacher who cannot control his class cannot teach--corporal
punishment may be needed in certain instances to enforce such control." See Note, 6
Crxv.-MAn. L. 1,Ev. 313 (1957).
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